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The Treaty-Making Power is Not a Peril
by Moses H. Thompson*
T HE POWER To MAKE TREATIES with foreign nations, as a sov-
ereign right, has been exercised by our federal government
under our Constitution for over one hundred and seventy years.
It has been utilized as a fundamental part of our defense against
aggression and has been exercised successfully in dealing with
the other world powers in all matters. In times past a great
nation could close its borders to cultural and economic intro-
gression for extended periods by maintaining huge border
armies to check the migration of people. It was probably a fear
of ideas more than the fear of foreign tribes. Today isolationism
in any form is but a fabulous dream. The populace no longer
limit their thoughts to things that happen in the United States.
We are living in an era of television, atomic development and
supersonic speed; what happened in Budapest or Rome today
is common conversation in United States tomorrow. Because
of this international awareness, we realize that in order to re-
main leaders in world affairs we must live with the world and
not as a disjecta membra. One of the primary sources of a
nation's ability to live peaceably in this world is vested in the
sovereign prerogative of making international agreements and
sustaining diplomatic intercourse with its neighbors.
In the United States the treaty-making power is vested in
our President and the Senate.1 Many persons fear this power;
they feel that it is so great that it could be used as an instrument
to destroy our American democracy. They fear that by treaty
the Constitution of the United States may be repealed and re-
placed by political concepts that are multifarious to our basic
* Moses H. Thompson is a former editor of the Cleveland-Marshall Law
Review. He was graduated from Sandusky High School and attended West
Virginia State College. During World War II he served in the European
Theater of Operations with the United States Army Signal Corps. He is
married and the father of two children.
1 U. S. CONST. Art. 1l § 2, clause 2. "He shall have power, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds
of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate and, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other
officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein provided
for, and which shall be established by law; but Congress may by law vest
the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments."
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freedoms. Because of the structure of our government I feel
that these fears are not well substantiated. Fears were voiced
by our early leaders while the Constitution was in its embryonic
state. James Madison, the "Father of the Constitution," ably
defended the power by these words:
"I think it (the treaty making power) rests on the safest
foundation as it is. The objects of treaties is the regulation
of intercourse with foreign nations, and is external. I do
not think it possible to enumerate all the cases in which
such external regulations would be necessary. Would it be
right to define all cases in which congress could exercise its
authority? The definition might, and probably would, be de-
fective. They might be restrained by such a definition from
exercising the authority where it would be essential to the
interest and safety of the community. It is most safe, there-
fore, to leave it to be exercised as contingencies may arise." 2
This statement is a partial revelation of the theory behind
our Constitution which makes it one of the most magnificently
constructed documents in the world. The words that best fit
this theory are flexibility or elasticity. The Constitution is not
a precise mold into which a nation has to be fitted. The Con-
stitution allows for expansion, in social as well as political con-
cepts. This elasticity gives the nation an opportunity to grow
in a kaleidoscopic environment. Because of this idea the treaty
power is not a precise power which can be measured by exact-
ing language.
The treaty-making power does have its limits and restraints.
The first of these can be found in Article II, section 2, clause 2
of the Constitution of the United States3 which gives the Presi-
dent power to make treaties with the advice and consent of two-
thirds of the Senate. The Senatorial concurrence that is neces-
sary is a positive restriction. This is the only restriction con-
tained in the Constitution; the other restrictions are found in
the peculiar nature of the power itself in relation to our federal
statutes and the decisions of our federal courts in regard to
treaties. The restraints are there by implication.4 As stated by
Randolph Tucker:
2 3 Eliot, Debates (2d ed. 1876) 514, 515.
3 See note 1 supra.
4 Swayne, Justice: "It need hardly be said a treaty cannot change theConstitution or be held valid if it be in violation of the instrument. This
results from the nature and fundamental principles of our government. The
effects of treaties and acts of Congress, when in conflict, is not settled by
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"A treaty, therefore, cannot take away essential liberties
secured by the Constitution to the people. A treaty cannot
bind the United States to do what their Constitution forbids
them to do. We may suggest a further limitation. A treaty
cannot compel any department of the government to do
what the Constitution submits to its exclusive and absolute
will." 5
As incomprehensible as the thought may be, there are those
who feel that a treaty can abrogate the Constitution. The basis
of their consternation is Article VI of the United States Con-
stitution which states that treaties "shall be the supreme law." 6
The words of Article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution can have
only one meaning which is that it, the Constitution, is the su-
preme law to which all other laws shall be subject and neces-
sarily subordinate. The Constitution is the law. (Emphasis
supplied.) All existing laws in the United States were made
pursuant thereto and all future laws must be made pursuant
thereto. If the laws were put in their order first in rank would
be the Constitution, second, laws and treaties of the federal
government, third, constitutions of the respective states, fourth,
laws passed by state legislative bodies, and fifth, local laws
(county, township and city ordinances).v Treaties are placed in
the same category as federal statutes and have the same force
and effect.8
This treaty-making power that is in the hands of the
executive branch embraces numerous fields. The fields that
may be embraced are to be considered as broad as the power
itself appears to be. Usually it involves trade agreements be-
tween nations, agreements for non-aggression or mutual de-
the Constitution. But the question is not involved in any doubt as to its
proper solution. A treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress (Foster
v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 314) and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty."
The Cherookee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616, 620 (U. S. 1870); Chinese Exclusion
Cases, 130 U. S. 581, 600 (1889); Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 597,
599 (1884).
5 2 Tucker, Constitution of the United States (1899), p. 715.
q U. S. CoNsT. Art. VI clause 2. "This Constitution and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall
be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the
contrary notwithstanding."
7 Findlay, Your Rugged Constitution (Rev. ed. 1952), p. 185.
8 Palmeri v. Stockton Theatres, 32 Cal. 53, 195 P 2d 103 (1948).
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fense or the treatment to be granted the citizens of the contract-
ing nations9 while resident in the respective countries. It is
used when new territory is acquired and provisions have to be
made for the establishment of government. 10 Also this power
was employed extensively when the government was dealing
with the various Indian nations." Problems arising from extra-
dition of foreign citizens have been handled by treaties drawn
up between nations. 12 Butler, in his work on the treaty-making
power, strongly maintains that the national government may by
treaty cede even an entire state, if it is necessary to preserve
the interest of the whole nation.13
Individual states fear this treaty-making power because its
ultimate effect might be to abrogate important parts of their
Constitutions and negate some of their statutory laws. 14 There
is a judicial requirement that a treaty be construed liberally so
as to carry out the intention of the contracting nations but not
so far as to infringe the Constitution of the United States or to
invade the province of the state in matters which are inherently
within the power of the state.15 But this is not very clear reason-
ing in light of the famous case of Missouri v. Holland,16 in which
case the State of Missouri sought an injunction against the
United States game warden. The State contended the statute
was an unconstitutional interference with the reserved rights
of the State and the acts of the defendant invaded the sovereign
rights of the state. In his opinion Mr. Justice Holmes justified
9 De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 267 (1890); Dorr v. United States,
195 U. S. 138, 140 (1904); See Also Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259 (U. S.
1817); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U. S. 433 (1921).
10 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 279 (1901); See Also De Lima v. Bid-
well, 182 U. S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 103 Fed. 72 (1900), rev'd in
182 U. S. 221 (1901).
11 Jones v. Meecham, 175 U. S. 1 (1899), citing Johnson v. McIntosh, 8
Wheat. 543 (U. S. 1843); Mitchell v. United States, 9 Pet. 711, 748 (U. S.
1835); United States v. Brooks, 10 How. 422 (U. S. 1851); New York
Indians v. United States, 170 U. S. 1 (1898).
12 Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U. S. 508 (1911); See Also Grin v. Shine, 187
U. S 181 (1902); Pierce v. Creecy, 208 U. S. 616 (1908).
13 1 Butler, Treaty-Making Power of the United States (1902), 411-413:
2 id. 238 et seq., and particularly, 387-394.
14 Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816).
15 Antosz (Jantoz) v. State Compensation Com'r, 130 W. Va. 260, 43 S. E.
2d 397 (1947).
16 252 U. S. 416 (1919); 11 A. L. R. 984.
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the right to abrogate the sovereign police powers of the state
by Congress in executing the treaty by the President with the
consent of the Senate, by writing:
"To answer this question it is enough to refer to the 10th
Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the
United States, because by article 2, section 2, the power to
make treaties is delegated expressly and by article 6, treaties
made under the authority of the United States, along with
the Constitution and laws of the United States, made in
pursuance thereof, are declared the supreme law of the
land. If the treaty is valid, there can be no dispute about
the validity of the statute under article 1, section 8, as a
necessary and proper means to execute the powers of gov-
ernment." 17
This literally means that a statute which would be unconsti-
tutional if enacted by Congress under its own delegated powers
becomes constitutional through the exercise of the treaty-making
power by the President.'s But despite this decision it must be
noted that even though an act of Congress is necessary to make
some treaties operative, Congress has the power to pass a sub-
sequent act which would nullify a previous act.19 This is another
indication of a restraint on the treaty-making power. Mr. Chief
Justice White in Raney v. U. S.20 wrote:
"Treaties are contracts between nations, and by the Con-
stitution are made the law of the land. But the Constitution
does not declare that the law so established shall never be
altered or repealed by Congress. Good faith toward the
other contracting nation might require Congress to refrain
from any making change, but if it does not act its enactment
becomes the controlling law in this country * * *"
This is consistent with other checks and balances that are
positive elements of our governmental structure. The same idea
is brought forth in Hijo v. United States21:
17 Id. at 423.
Is Contra: Prevost v. Greneaux, 19 How. 1 (U. S. 1856).
19 Harlan, Justice: "It is true that Congress did not, we assume, intend
by the Foraker Act to modify the treaty, but, if that act were deemed in-
consistent with the treaty, the act would prevail; for an act of Congress,
passed after a treaty takes effect, must be respected and enforced, despite
any previous or existing treaty provision on the same subject." Alvarez Y
Sanchez v. United States, 216 U. S. 167, 175 (1908).
20 232 U. S. 310, 316 (1914).
21 194 U. S. 315, 324 (1904); See Also Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 271
(1898); Homer v. United States, 143 U. S. 570, 578 (1892); Kelley v. Hedden,
124 U. S. 196 (1888); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 194 (1888).
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"* * * for, it is settled that in case of a conflict between
an act of Congress and a treaty,-each being equally the
supreme law of the land,-the last one in date must pre-
vail."
A treaty and an act of Congress are both declared to be a
supreme law of the land; one is not considered superior to the
other. If the subject matter to which they relate are the same
the courts will construe them in such a way that they may both
be sustained. 22 If they are construed to be inconsistent and the
treaty is self executing23 (emphasis supplied), the one later in
date will control the subject matter.24 A treaty like a federal
statute can be nullified by a subsequent act of Congress. This
was expressed in United States v. Yee Tai25 by Justice Harlan
in the following manner:
"That it was competent for the two countries by treaty
to have superseded a prior act of Congress on the same sub-
ject is not to be doubted; for otherwise the declaration in
the Constitution that a treaty, concluded in the mode pre-
scribed by that instrument, shall be the supreme law of the
land, would not have due effect. As Congress may by a
statute abrogate, so far at least as this country is concerned,
a treaty previously made by the United States with other
nations, so the United States may by treaty supersede a
prior act of Congress on the same subject."
It is only natural that treaties should be superior to the
laws of every state. There is also a plausible reason why many
states fear this power they have delegated. Some state legis-
22 United States v. Larivier (43 Gallons of Whisky), 108 U. S. 491, 496
(1887).
23 "Under the Constitution, a treaty is regarded as equivalent to an act
of legislature whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legisla-
tive provision, but when the terms of the stipulation import a contract,
when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial, department, and the legis-
lature must execute the contract before it becomes a rule of the court."
Bolshanin v. Zlobin, 76 F. Supp. 281 (1948); See Also United States v.
Percheman, 7 Pet. 51 (U. S. 1833).
24 Davis, Notes, United States Treaty Volume (1776-1887), 1228, citing
Cushing, At. Gen., 6. Op. 296; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 314; United States
v. Arrendona, 6 Pet. 735, "Where a treaty cannot be executed without the
aid of an act of Congress, it is the duty of Congress to enact such laws.
Congress has never failed to perform that duty. But when it can be
executed without legislation, the courts will enforce its provisions." Cook
v. United States, 288 U. S. 102 (1933); Ex Parte Webb, 225 U. S. 263 (1912).
25 185 U. S. 213, 220 (1902); See Also La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United




latures have enacted legislation that has been nullified by the
enforcement of treaty provisions. A good example of this can
be found in the case of Sei Fujii v. State.2 6 The dispute con-
cerned the validity of the Alien Land Law of California. The
statute required the escheat to the state of land owned by an
alien who was neither eligible for citizenship nor protected by
treaty. A resident of Japanese descent who was ineligible for
naturalization brought action to determine whether an escheat
of his land occurred. Judge Wilson in his first opinion held the
act was valid apart from the United Nations Charter27 which as a
treaty was not pertinent. Later he declared that the Charter
as a treaty was the supreme law of the land and bound all judges
in every state and also:
"The integrity and vitality of the Charter and the con-
fidence which it inspires would wane and eventually be
brought to naught by failure to act according to the an-
nounced purposes that the restrictions of the statute based
on eligibility to citizenship, but which ultimately and ac-
tually are referable to race or color, must be and are there-
fore declared untenable and unenforcible."
And further on:
"A perusal of the Charter renders it manifest that re-
strictions contained in the Alien Land Law are in direct
conflict with the plain terms of the Charter above quoted
and with purposes announced therein by the framers * * *
Clearly such a discrimination against a people of one race
is contrary both to the letter and the spirit of the Charter
which, as a treaty, is paramount to every law of every state
in conflict with it. The Alien Land Law must therefore yield
to the treaty as the superior authority."
The powers of the President in relation to our international
negotiations are not any more dangerous than the powers that
were delegated by the people to Congress. This power, if it can
be considered an evil, is a necessary one. Congressional enact-
ments express the will of the people and that is all that a treaty
does, even though the procedure that gives validity to their
acts is different. Justice Wilson in Ware v. Hylton2 8 expressed
the idea by writing:
26 217 P. 2d (Cal. App. 2d) 481, 488 (1950), rehearing denied 218 P. 2d (Cal.
App. 2d) 595 (1950).
27 59 Stat. 1035-1218, June 26, 1945; ratified by the United States Senate,
July 28, 1945.
28 3 Dall. 199, 280 (U. S. 1796).
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"Independent, therefore, of the Constitution of the
United States (which authoritatively inculcates the obliga-
tion of contracts), the treaty is sufficient to remove every
impediment founded on the law of Virginia. The State
made the law; the State was a party to the making of the
treaty; a law does nothing more than express the will of a
nation, and a treaty does the same."
Justice Swayne also expressed the same viewpoint in
Hauenstein v. Lynham.29 It cannot be doubted that the Con-
stitution is superior to all laws and cannot be relegated to a
lesser importance. It is also safe to say that the same will of the
people that is expressed in the federal statutes is expressed in
the treaties made by the executive branch of our government.
The only requirement is that it conform to the word and spirit
of the Constitution. 30
Federal courts have the power to construe the treaties as it
does congressional enactments but the courts are bound by the
construction put on the treaty.3 1 Treaties, of course, are more
liberally construed by the courts than are legislative enact-
ments.32 The judiciary will not venture beyond the treaty to
discover the authority each contracting nation had to enter into
the agreement because such investigation is political and not
judicial. This reasoning was well developed in Doe et al. v.
Braden,3 3 which controversy arose from the treaty by which
29 Swayne, Justice: "It is the declared will of the People of the United
States that every treaty made by the authority of the United States shall
be superior to the Constitution and laws of any individual state, and their
will alone is to decide. If a law of a state, contrary to a treaty, is not
void but voidable only, by a repeal or nullification of a state legislature,
this certain consequence follows, that the will of a small part of the
United States may control or defeat the will of the whole." 100 U. S. 483,
489 (1890).
30 "A statute enacted by Congress expresses the will of the people of the
United States in the most solemn form. If not repugnant to the Constitu-
tion, it is made by that instrument a part of the supreme law of the land,
and should never be held to be displaced by a treaty, subsequently con-
cluded, unless it is impossible for both to stand together and be enforced."
United States v. Yee Tai, supra note 25 at 222.
31 United States v. Reynes, 9 How. 127 (U. S. 1850).
32 "It is a canon of interpretation to so construe a law or treaty as to
give effect to the object designed, and for that purpose all its provisions
must be examined in the light of attendant and surrounding circumstances."
Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U. S. 453, 475 (1891); See Also Dagno v. Cerri, 93
Ohio St. 345, 112 N. E. 1037 (1916); L. R. A. 1917A; Re. Faltosin, 33 Misc.
18, 67 N. Y. Supp. 1119 (1900).
33 16 How. 635, 657 (U. S. 1853); 3 Willoughby on the Constitution of the
United States (2d ed. 1929) sec. 849, p. 1332.
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Florida was ceded to the United States. The plaintiff claimed
the land under a grant from the King of Spain to the Duke of
Aragon; the court found that the treaty as a law of the United
States prevailed and the action could not be maintained. In the
words of Justice Taney:
"It is said, however, that the King of Spain by the Con-
stitution under which he was then acting and administering
.the government, had not the power to annul it by treaty or
otherwise; that if the power existed anywhere in the Spanish
government it resided in the cortes; and that it does not
appear, in the ratification, that it was annulled by that body
or by its authority or consent.
"But these are political questions and not judicial. They
belong exclusively to the Political Department of the gov-
ernment.
"By the Constitution of the United States, the President
has the power, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur. And he is authorized to appoint ambas-
sadors, other public ministers and consuls, and to receive
them from foreign nations; and is thereby enabled to obtain
accurate information of the political condition of the nation
with which he treats; who exercises over it the powers of
sovereignty, and under what limitations, and how far the
party who ratifies the Treaty is authorized, by its form of
government, to bind the nation and persons and things
within its territory and dominion, by treaty stipulations.
And the Constitution declares that all treaties made under
the authority of the United States should be the supreme
law of the land.
"The treaty is therefore a law made by the proper
authority, and the courts of justice have no right to annul
or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the
Constitution of the United States * * "
And further on:
"And it would be impossible for the Executive Depart-
ment of the government to conduct our foreign relations
with any advantage to the country, and fulfill the duties
which the Constitution has imposed upon it, if every court
in the country was authorized to inquire and decide when
the person who ratified the treaty in behalf of a foreign
nation had the power, by its Constitution and laws, to make
the engagements into which he entered."
Also the court does not have the power to decide whether
a particular treaty has been breached. Whether a treaty, a con-
tract between nations, has been breached can only be con-
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1954
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sidered when Congress emphatically declares it broken. Judge
Swan in the George Warren Corporation v. United States34
wrote:
"It is not for a court to say whether a treaty has been
broken or what remedy shall be given; this is a matter of
international concern, which the two sovereign states must
determine by diplomatic exchanges, or by such means as
enables one state to force upon another the obligation of
the treaty."
And further reasoning was presented when he wrote in the
same case:
"Obviously, it would not do for the courts to declare an
act is a breach of treaty and results in this or that remedy.
The remedy accorded might not content the foreign powei-
or might bring about a conflict between the executive and
judicial branches of our government."
Although no treaty has ever been declared unconstitutional
by a court there is dictum to the effect that if called on to do so
the courts would not hesitate to declare one beyond the powers
granted by the Constitution. It may some day be the duty of
our Supreme Court to take such a stand to preserve the Con-
stitution and the nation. There should be no doubt that they
would exercise this prerogative in the proper case. As Justice
Angellotti wrote in his opinion in Ex Parte Heikich Terui: 35
"We are aware of no decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States by which a treaty provision has been
declared to be beyond the treaty power, but it may fairly
be claimed that there are such matters."
The framers of our Constitution did not enter into the treaty
matter without extensive debate. It was questioned in all its
particulars and aspects and was found to be a necessary attri-
bute of sovereignty. What foreign nation would have been fool-
hardy enough to have attempted to negotiate with thirteen
states separately and expect to develop a satisfactory inter-
national relationship? Today with forty-eight states it would
be even more discouraging and futile. The treaty-making power
has its limitations and can be controlled; if the restrictions are
not strict enough in written form they are well provided for
34 George Warren Corp. v. United States, 94 F. 2d 597, 599 (1938); Techt
v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 128 N. E. 185 (1920), writ of certiorari denied in
254 U. S. 643 (1920); Charlton v. Kelley, 229 U. S. 447 (1913).
35 187 Cal. 20, 200 P. 954, 956 (1921); 17 A. L. R. 630.
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by implication. It is not a power that has to be feared as a
menace to our way of life. Our democratic government is more
than a mere body of laws; it is more of a living thing; a com-
bination of laws, trust and people endowed with a profound love
of freedom. The men who lead our nation are elevated to these
positions of trust by those who believe they will serve their
country faithfully.36 Of course, if this trust is breached there
are remedies that go beyond public censure. I do not conceive,
in the light of this, that we should fear the treaty making power.
One treaty or a series of treaties during one brief period in our
history could not destroy the Constitution or even undermine
it enough to upset our established form of government. By
emasculating the treaty-making power we would be weakening
our constitutional form of government in order to quell a fear
that is abeyant.
36 Madison: supra note 2, "It is not to be presumed that, in transactions
with foreign countries, those who regulate them will feel the whole force
of national attachment of their country. The contract being between their
own nation and a foreign nation, is it not presumable they will, as far as
possible, advance the interest of their own country?"
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1954
